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The PHM project "began as a major NATO acquisition pro-
gram consisting of 60 or more ships for international
purchase. Today the program consists of just six ships for
the United States alone. This thesis reviews the history of
the program, the design considerations and the current prob-
lems experienced by the program manager. An analysis of
the rationale behind the decisions which led to the reduc-
tion in scope of the program suggests that factors inherent
to the current systems acquisition process caused the cut
back in the program and that these were independent of the
program manager's efforts. The results of the analysis
suggest that these factors have the potential to affect the
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The U. 5. Navy's Patrol Hydrofoil Missile (PHM) ship is
a defense application of a relatively new hydrodynamic con-
cept. Previous hydrofoil ships using fixed foils which
conform to the water's surface like water skiis have great
speed, but their use is restricted to calm seas. This
limitation makes them unacceptable for use by the U. S.
Navy.
The latest version of hydrofoil ships utilizes forward
and aft submerged foils which in a sense "fly" through the
water under the surface much like airfoils through the air.
The moveable trailing edges of these foils are continuously
adjusted by an automatic control system fed by signals
from acoustic wave height sensors. As the foils adjust to
the wave size, the result is a stable ride in almost any
sea state. The forward foil system, in addition, includes
a fully swivelled strut that provides directional control
and allows the ship to bank into turns giving the ship a
high degree of maneuverability. The foils and struts, both
fore and aft, are retractible to permit hullborne operation
with reduced draft restrictions and to facilitate access
for inspection and maintenance.
Use of this advanced hydrofoil technology in the PHM
program has resulted in a warship capable of speeds in

excess of kO knots in virtually any sea state. Further-
more, it is designed to NATO standards and can be easily
adapted for individual use by any NATO nation or coopera-
tive multi-national use in a NATO Task Group,
Considering the fact that the ship does everything it
was designed to do and that its potential contribution to
naval seapower is extraordinary, one is lead to believe
that a program to build a fleet of such ships might be a
worthwhile undertaking. In fact, the PHM was a major pro-
ject at one time with planned production of at least 60
ships for multi-national purchase. Today, the PHM program
consists of just six United States Navy ships (one opera-
tional prototype and five currently under construction).
How such a promising and exciting program could undergo
such an extreme reversal is intriguing and warrants
investigation.
E . PURPOSE
This thesis reviews the chronology of the FHM and analyzes
some of the major historical events in an attempt to dis-
cover the reasons for such a reduction in scope of the pro-
gram. The analy/sis suggests that factors in the systems
acquisition process external to the program manager's span
of control were responsible for the cut-back.
C. SCOPE
Data and information were obtained through research of
published literature, PHM logistic plans, Congressional
8

testimony, interviews with personnel involved and a one-
month experience tour at the PHM project office in
Washington, D. C.
In a non-technical approach, the chronology describes
all the major events to date In the program including the
considerations which contributed to the final design. Cur-
rent acquisition policy, procedures and environmental fac-
tors evident in the PHM program will be analyzed in terms
of their potential to affect any weapons acquisition pro-
gram independent of the program manager's executive ability.
II. CHRONOLOGY OF THE PHM PROGRAM
A. EARLY CONCEPTS
In mid-1969, NATO Commanders expressed the need for
ships to combat the threat posed by Soviet surface combat-
ants in the coastal and narrow seas environments of North-
ern Europe and the Mediterranean Sea. Later that year, a
sub-group of eleven NATO nations from a NATO Information
exchange group met to discuss the requirement. In early
1970, NATO Exploratory Group Two was established to study
the concept of a common fast patrol craft.
Each nation recognized the potential benefits of a co-
operative program. Not only was this an opportunity to
upgrade their defense capabilities at relatively low cost,
but also, a single ship class for use by all NATO allies
would enhance the capability of a NATO Task Force from both
operational and logistics points of view. The United States

hoped for the additional benefit of being able to reduce
its NATO commitment to the European area as those coun-
tries improved their own naval capabilities.
Prior to the establishment of Exploratory Group Two,
the United States had designed, built and tested four
hydrofoil ships: HIGEPOINT (PCH-1), 120 tons, delivered in
1963; FLAGSTAFF (PGH-1) and TUCUMCAHI (PGH-2), 60-70 tons,
in 1968; and PLAINVIEW (AGSH-1), 310 tons in 1969. As of
November 1972 these craft had accumulated more than 2?00
hours of foilbome operations /lj. This experience made it
clear that proven technology existed in the United States,
and that submerged hydrofoil platforms would be a feasible
low-risk venture J2J .
The United States, therefore, proposed a 4-0- tor. sub-
merged foil craft as the most suitable means of meeting the
XATC mission requirement because of its speed and maneuver-
ability in high sea states. Exploratory Group Two concur-
red with this proposal, as did the NATO Naval Armaments
Group who subsequently approved the establishment of I re-
ject Group Six to conduct the planning stages of the pro-
gram and the initial determination of the ship's character-
istics. The United States logically assumed chairmanship of
Project Group Six and sponsorship of the program.
Through June 1971, the United States conducted further
hydrofoil baseline design studies and cost estimates. These
design data provided for the operational performance agreed,
upon by Exploratory Group Two and incorporated previously
10

expressed national requirements. At a June 1971 meeting
the United States agreed to produce two PHN lead ships if a
design satisfactory to at least one other NATO nation could
be achieved. At that meeting it was also mutually agreed,
that active participants of subsequent meetings would be
limited to those nations who had formally declared their
intent to proceed with the cooperative hydrofoil project
and, subject to an agreed Memorandum of Understanding, to
formally enter the program as an "engaged." nation and. com-
mit resources thereto. Letters of intent were eventually
signed in early 1972 by the Government of Italy and the
Federal Republic of Germany.
In October 1971 the United States announced, its inten-
tions to award, the lead, ship design and production con-
tract to the Boeing Company, builder of the HIGHFCINT
(PCE-1) and TUCUMCARI (FGH-2), and that the initial effort
under the contract would be feasibility design studies.
The objective of these studies was to obtain clear agree-
ment on a specific common ship design which would satisfy
ail engaged, nations" requirements. Further, due to the
advance in program schedule without having yet obtained a
satisfactory Memorandum of Understanding, the United
States indicated it would proceed at its own expense with
the NATO design, share the results of these studies with
all engaged nations, with costs to be reinbursed only by
those engaged nations who later signed, the Memorandum of
Understanding, and to conduct all aspects of the design
11

development, contract definitization and management in co-
operation with the engaged nations.
The letter contract was awarded to Boeing in November
1971. Feasibility design was completed in March 1972, and
a Memorandum of Understanding was signed approximately six
months later by the Government of Italy and the Federal
Republic of Germany. Because of unwillingness to commit
funds all other nations either dropped from the program or
reverted to observer status with the option of rejoining
the project at any time pursuant to approval by the origi-
nal three committed nations.
1. NATO PEM Organization
Upon signing the Memorandum of Understanding, a
permanent Steering Committee composed of senior representa-
tives of each participating nation was formed. Each member
was responsible for the necessary coordination with appro-
priate authorities of his own country. Changes in
technical approach, cost or schedule which would have major
impact required unanimous committee consent.
The Memorandum of Understanding provided for the
initial chairman of the Steering Committee to be the United
States member. In addition the Memorandum of Understand-
ing provided for a NATO Project Office to serve as the
executive staff of the Steerirg Committee to perform the
complex management functions associated with ship design,









designated to provide the Project Manager. (See Table
I for Project Organization Chart.)
2. Costs
In achieving the objectives of this cooperative
effort, the participating nations shared design and non-
recurring prototype construction costs. These costs in-
cluded the cost of developing the standard ship design
(to be discussed later), design validation and operation
of the administrative project staffs. The Memorandum of
Understanding specified exact dollar commitments for
each country but did not include a cost escalation clause,
production cost savings were expected to be real-
ized by the aass production of all ships at a single planl
Cost benefits were expected to accrue from assembly line
production in great quantities, and proportionate sharing
of fixed production costs would lower the unit cost per
ship for each country /2j.
A ship is designed to perform, a mission. Capability
to accomplish a mission depend.s not only on the operation-
al capability of the hardware, but also on the ability to
logistically support it. Therefore, a ship design is the
end result of an iterative process which attempts to opti-
mize mission capability by making trade-offs between
operational and logistics capabilities. What follows is
14

some of the operational and. logistics support considera-
tions which produced the final PHM design.
1, Operational Considerations
The mission scenario required the PHM to be capa-
ble of operating offensively, either independently or in
company with PHMs from the same or different countries,
against enemy surface combatants in coastal and narrow
seas environments. It had to be capable of performing
this mission during patrols of up to five days. A minimum
of two days upkeep would be necessary between operational
periods jlj.
a. Standard Ship Design
It was recognized during the early stages of
the ship acquisition process that a single version of the
PHM for use by all nations was not likely. However, to
assure the effectiveness of their operation together with-
in a NATO Task Force, it was desirable that the individual
national FKNs have similar basic characteristics. To
achieve this objective, a standard PHM ship was designed
for multi-national use yet retained sufficient design
flexibility to allow for the individual variations of any
country particularly in the area of combat systems equip-
ment. The standard PHM has characteristics as indicated
in Table 2 fll
.
The hull form, size and the major structural
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2 Diesels




controls and main propulsion machinery are part of the
standard PHM design. Additionally, the auxiliary equip-
ment and arrangements, deckhouse and personnel accommo-
dations are standard
.
Due to weight restrictions and other consider-
ations unique to hydrofoil operations, the PEM has a
large percentage of equipments and systems which are not
used on traditional combatants. These systems/equipments
are listed in Table 3.
b. United States Variant of the PHK
Unlike the PHMs used "ay other NATO nations
which would operate from a single home port, the U. S.
variant had to be able to perform its mission anywhere in
the world. In order to provide for global mobility, early
logistics planners envisioned a hydrofoil support ship
.
(AGHS) to accompany the six-ship PHM squadron to provide
logistics support.
The primary weapons suite of the U. 3.
variant includes:
1 MK 75 7 6MM GUN
8 HARPOON MISSILE CANNISTER LAUNCHERS
1 MK 92 MOD 1 GFC3
2 MK 3^ CHAFF LAUNCHERS
c. Country Variations of the PHM
The MK 75 Cto Melara 76 mm gun satisfies the
mission requirements of all national participants. There
is space aboard to equip a standard PHM with additional





A. MB 8V331TC80 Diesel Engines (Mercedes Eenz)
B. Waterjet Propulsors (Aerojet General)
C. Gas Turbine Ship's Service Power Unit (Airesearch)
D. AN/SLR-20 ESM Receiver (Litton Amecon)
E. Gyro P1^41E (LITEF)
F. High Pressure (3000 PSD Hydraulic Systems (Boeing)
G. Submerged Strut and Foil System (Boeing)
H. Foilborne Automated Ship Control System (Boeing)
I. AN/SPS-63 True Motion Navigation Radar (SMA)
13

design flexibility permits the installation of various
types of missile systems in place of the Harpoon system
such as the Italian Otomat or the French Exocet. Fire
control system alternatives include the German WM-28 and
the Italian Argo System \2~\.
2. Balance of Payments Considerations
Since the PEN was originally a joint NATO venture
it had a requirement for balance of payments equaliza-
tion (offset) between all participants [2J. Each nation
was thus assured that within reasonable limits, the value
of components, materials and services it purchased from
other .participating nations would be offset by the com-
bined purchases made by other nations from itself. The
key objective of the cooperative effort was the effective
utilization of the military, industrial, scientific and
technical resources of the participating nations in terms
of both men and materials, in the interests of mutual
defense.
As a result of the foregoing, much of the PEM
equipment is of foreign design or manufacture (e.g., the
fire control system (Dutch), the 76mm gun and navigational
radar (Italian), the gyro compass, air conditioning and
diesel hullborne engines (German)). Furthermore, the
PEM was designed and constructed using the metric system
as the basic system of measurement to facilitate the
interface of foreign equipments,
19

3. Manning, Maintenance and Training Concepts
A manning concept is a combination of the opera-
tional concept and the maintenance concept. It
incorporates the quantities and skill levels of personnel
required to operate and maintain a ship in its projected
operational environment. Normally, U. 5. Navy ships carry
a crew large enough to perform all organizational level
maintenance and operate the ship as well. The ship's
manning document attempts to optimize the mix of operation-
al and maintenance personnel.
The manning concept for the PHM differs from the
standard Navy surface unit manning concept. To achieve
the foilborne capability of the FHM, which is its primary
operational asset, trade-offs were required in the size and
weight of the vessel. Living space had to be sacrificed
for engineering, performance and weapons delivery capa-
bility. Essentially the same traditional tasks must be
accomplished aboard PHM, but they must be performed by
less personnel.
To accomplish the reduced manning objective,
functions previously requiring more than one watch sta-
tion were combined into single watch stations. This was
made possible by the development of automated equipment
with built-in redundancy. Examples are the Helm and
Engineering Operations watch stations.
The maintenance concept was also non-traditional.
The complexity and numbers of the systems and equipments
20

of the ship required more maintenance personnel than the
ship had the capability to support at sea. Furthermore,
crew movement was restricted on weather decks during
foilborne operations for reasons of crew safety, and, as
a consequence, preventive maintenance could not be accom-
plished when foilborne. These conditions and the reduced
operational manning concept motivated the establishment
of the Mobile Logistic Support Group (MLSG) concept.
The MLSG concept parallels the support concept
used by the aviation community in that the weapons system
is primarily manned by operators and most maintenance is
to be performed during the brief time when the system Is
not operational. The use of this maintenance concept
requires special consideration during design. For
example, levels of reliability and maintainability are
needed which minimize the need for preventive and correc-
tive maintenance actions underway. Additionally, the ship
was designed with significant built-in test equipment to
facilitate fault detection, isolation and repair. This
equipment, in conjunction with the standard hand tools
carried aboard, could be used to effect repairs while
underway. Onboard spares are limited in range and depth
and mostly include only fuses, light bulbs and critical
modules Qf] .
The ship was logistically designed to operate at
sea for short periods of time up to five days maximum.
21

During this time period, some limited, daily preventive
maintenance would have to be performed and emergency cor-
rective maintenance may be required. All other maintenance
is deferred to the ML3G. It was decided early in the
conceptual phase that the operators of the ship must be
skilled enough to perform these underway maintenance tasks.
The manning concept then became one of utilizing few
numbers of highly skilled individuals for the ?HM who
could operate the equipment and maintain it if necessary.
Knowledge regarding required personnel quantities
and skill levels was gained through the fleet use of pre-
vious hydrofoil craft built for the U. S. Navy, This
experience, combined with the expected weapons configura-
tion of the PHM, made it possible to estimate the berthing
and living requirements for the ship. Once the total,
number of personnel was known the ship was designed around
that quantity.
The final ship's design limited crew size to five
officers and nineteen enlisted men. Appendix A lists the
manpower requirements and gives the procedure used to de-
termine them. Appendix A's inclusion is intended to
exemplify the degree of detail that entered the logistics
and design planning phases. It also establishes the
need for filling operational billets with qualified crew
embers.
Training of the PHM crew was another considera-
tion that entered the design trade-off process. The
22

reduced operational and maintenance manning concepts and
the sophistication and uniqueness of the hardware systems
created an extraordinary training requirement for the crew
members. Furthermore, this training had to be received
prior to reporting for duty aboard ship since the lack of
extra berthing space would limit the opportunity for on-the-
job training while underway. The problems of training such
crews will be discussed in a later chapter.
Although the built-in test equipment would reduce
the maintenance training requirements to some extent, the
crew would still have to be trained to correct any critical
equipment breakdown that might occur during the five-day
mission. These training requirements were forecasted and
planned for in the Navy Training Plan (NTP) jjQ for FHM.
Appendix B discusses the training concept in more detail.
C. PROTOTYPE PRODUCTION AND EVALUATION
The optimistic results of the feasibility studies per-
formed by 3oeing and NATO Froject Group Six and the earlier
U. S. Navy Hydrofoil supporting technology are reported by
Duff [5] . A favorable DSARC II decision resulted and the
Navy awarded the U. 3. lead ship design and construction
contract to Boeir.g in February 1973* Construction commenced
In April 1973. The ship, USS PEGASUS (FHM-1), was launched
in November 197^» six weeks behind schedule.
The launching was followed by an extensive test and
evaluation of the platform and combat systems culminated
23

by a one-month independent Operational Evaluation (GPEVAL)
by Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force
( COMOPTEVFOR ) in May 1976. Complete results of this test
program are reported by Duff, Schmidt and Terry [6/
.
kAn eight-month major overhaul commenced in September
976 to correct OFEVAL deficiencies. According to
Shrader and Duff jT} the overhaul period was used "to
strengthen the foils and struts in areas where cracking
has occurred, and the main propulsor gearbox was refur-
bished with stiff er pinion shafting, higher quality gears
and improved load carrying gear configuration. Also,
the aluminum propulsor inlet duct was modified slightly
to extend life, and a number of combat systems improve-
ments were incorporated, including a combined radar video
and navigation chart display (TANCAV) for both the Combat
Information Center and the Pilot House and an improved
seating and weapons control capability for the Tactical
Action Officer (TAO) station".
These and other minor deficiencies were corrected
by April 1977 a^d Navy Acceptance Trials (AT) were con-
ducted in June 1977 by the Board of Inspection and Survey
(INSURV). The president of the INSUHV Board cited IEGASUS
as having one of the finest trials "in the memory of the
Board" jlj
. PEGASUS was delivered to the Navy in June




Understanding the historical account of the PHM acqui-
sition program process is facilitated by examining Table k,
courtesy of Shrader and Duff [lj . Briefly, FY 1975 and FY
1976 funds were appropriated for five production ships and
a fixed price incentive production contract was awarded to
Boeing in October 1977. Production is underway at this time,
but a flurry of political activity between 197^ and commence-
ment of production, at times, made the fate of the PHM un-
certain. The following sub-paragraphs itemize some of the
decisions. The rationale for these decisions will be dis-
cussed in more detail in the "Analysis" chapter which
follows.
1. Production Approved for Five PHMs
197^4- was a turbulent year for the PHM program. Navy
in-house bickering over weapons suites, technological diffi-
culties experienced by the Boeing Company during construction
of the prototype and schedule delays caused a significant
upward trend in the estimated cost per ship. A PHM Project
Office spokesman stated that cost escalation caused the Con-
gress in 197^ to approve funds for only five of the proposed
28 production ships. Only strong DOD and Navy appeal action
saved the program from being deleted altogether. In ad-
dition, the Government of Italy decided to withdraw from the
program and to pursue construction of smaller less expensive






2. Request for Proposal
In June of 1976, the "Request for Froposal" was
issued and the Eoeing proposal was received in October
1976. The successful Acceptance Trials of the PEGASUS and
enthusiastic comments from fleet operational commanders
who had observed its use caused a favorable DSARC III
decision by the end of 197& despite issties raised by DOD
systems analysts to the effect that the ship was not
sufficiently cost effective to justify its procurement.
In January 1977 the Deputy Secretary of Defense advised
the Secretary of the Navy (3ECNAV) that production of JEMs
could proceed.
3. Recision Froposal
When the Administration changed on 20 January
1977, defense priorities were reevaluated in anticipation
of a balanced federal budget by I9SI. Based on its own
studies and the expectation of budget cuts, the Navy now
felt that the PHM was not sufficiently cost effective when
compared to other spending priorities /7_7. The rationale
behind this change will be discussed in the "Analysis"
chapter. The Navy withdrew the §&3M planned for con-
version of a mothballed LST into a hydrofoil support
ship from the FY 1978 budget and, instead, requested funds
to deactivate the two operational platforms, the FCH-1
and AGEH-1, for hydrofoil research and development.
27

Defense Secretary Brown announced by memorandum in
April that the United States was planning to terminate
the FHM program. Since Boeing had not yet begun produc-
tion on the five remaining PHMs, President Carter submitted
a proposal to rescind the FY 75 and FY 76 funds which had
been appropriated for that purpose. (Passage of a re-
cision bill requires favorable action by both Houses of
Congress within ^5 days of submittal.) jjf]
.
Testimony was heard by the Defense Subcommittee
of the House Appropriations Committee in July 1977 and
,
despite unanimous DOD support in favor of recision,
Congress favored the program's continuation and the re-
cision bill did not pass. The Navy was obligated to
proceed with the five production ships and Boeing com-
menced construction in October 1977. Delivery will occur
in 1981 and 1982.
Congress did, however, accept the Navy's sugges-
tion to cut budget support for a logistics platform for
the MLSG. The FHM program office advises that an alter-
nate platform consisting of 50 portable vans was recently
proposed by the Navy and is included in POM 81.
4, NATO Program Ends
. In May 1977 the Federal Republic of Germany with-
drew from the FHM program to build less costly non-
hydrofoil missile patrol boats J7j. This event brought
28

an end to major NATO involvement in the PHM program. All
that remains is the procurement of the foreign equipments
for the U. S. variant.
III. ANALYSIS
The most significant observation about the FHM*s
history that would cause one to question the success of
the PEN program is the drastic reduction in scope that has
occurred since the program's inception. To summarize, PEN
began as a 60 ship NATO program, half of which were for use
by the United States. Support for the program gradually
deteriorated on grounds of reduced cost effectiveness,
beginning with the Congress in 197^ and ending with the
Navy and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1977. It is
only because of Congressional insistence that five ships
are currently being built.
This chapter deals with the rationale which caused the
FEN. to lose its attractiveness in comparison with other
programs, and the problems the current program manager
faces as a result of the cutback.
A. COST EFFECTIVENESS
Competition for limited federal funds is evident
throughout the government. The Department of Defense
competes with other governmental agencies and the indi-
vidual services compete for their shares. Within a
29

service, individual programs such as the phm compete with
other programs. Since there are not enough dollar re-
sources to fund each program a service believes it needs
in performance of its mission, measures of effectiveness
are necessary to evaluate and prioritize them. Highest
priority funding consideration is logically given to the
programs which provide the most national defense per
dollar expended.
Cost effectiveness provides such a measure and is
used to rank programs. It considers the mission category,
e.g., anti-surface ship warfare, anti-air warfare or anti-
submarine warfare, and, through simulated battle
techniques, computes the cost of each enemy ship, sub-
marine or aircraft killed J7J . This figure can be used
to compare the relative merits of programs in similar
mission roles.
1. Cost
The technology base which indicated the PHM to be
low-risk venture was apparently not as solid as was
)reviously supposed. In 197^ » cost escalation on the
order of two times the original estimates raised the price
from 420. 5Yi to $4lM per copy (both figures in 197^ dollars)
and was cited as the reason for all the anti-PKM decisions
which followed pjH
. The consequent reduction in cost
effectiveness caused the first cutback from 28 to five
production ships, the withdrawal of NATO participants and
30

lessened interest by the U. 5. Navy. In defense of the
program, cost growth should be placed in perspective as
follows: (All figures in 1974 dollars.) Original esti-
mates of unit ship cost for a production run of 28 ships
i
was approximately $20. 5M. Program growth and escalation
moved the unit price for 28 ships upwards to $28. 9M
corresponding to a cost growth factor of 1.4. Gutting
the program back to five ships made the unit price $41. 1M
and accounts for the majority of the cost growth factor
of two. Cost growth of 1.4, although still not desirable,
is not unusual in shipbuilding programs. This figure
compares favorably with the cost growth factor of 1.5
experienced by the highly successful FFG-7 program Vf] .
2. Mission
The Federal Republic of Germany was the first to
express a need for improved anti-surface ship capability
which led to the NATO mission requirement. They needed
a patrol craft to operate in the Baltic Sea to prevent
amphibious landings by the Warsaw Pact forces in the
area of the Baltic Sea approaches associated with attempts
to secure the entrance and exit to the sea. For their
purpose, the ship's mission was specific and single
purpose. Long-range capability of the ship was not a
critical factor because its operation was tied to a
specific geographic location and integrated with German
31

land-based naval aviation. The PHM was especially suited
for this mission because it served as a stable platform
which enabled the effective use of the surface to surface
weapons during rough seas Vjl .
Even though operation of the U. S. variant of
the PHM would not be restricted to a specific geographical
area, it was felt that its mission would approximate the
FRG mission, i.e., patrol coastal and choke point areas
similar to the Baltic Sea approaches |7J . Since it only
had anti-surface ship capability, its use would be
restricted to relatively benign areas where enemy aircraft
and submarines would not pose a threat. It would therefore
be used in a supportive role to free up larger multi-
mission combatants for mere hostile environments by
patrolling those areas where only a surface threat was
expected. It was felt that procurement of a single mission
ship was justified if it could be produced at a low cost ["71,
3. The Harpoon Missile
The NATO perceived threat of Warsaw Pact combatants
has not gone away or changed. The technology for challeng-
ing the threat, however, has changed. Prior to the de-
velopment of the Harpoon missile, guns mounted aboard ships
served as their primary anti-surface ship weapons system.
However, high seas states interfere with the use of guns.
Therefore, the submerged foil hydrofoil was valued since it




The Harpoon missile Is a recent innovation in anti-
surface ship warfare. It is an anti-ship cruise missile
with a range of about 60 miles [_?] . Most significantly,
its use does not require a stable platform. For this rea-
son, the Germans decided to buy Harpoon-equipped non-
hydrofoil patrol boats large enough to maneuver in rough
seas. They felt that this vessel could accomplish their
mission almost as well as the PHM, but at half the procure-
ment cost fyi
.
The U. S. Navy is currently equipping all destroyers,
frigates, cruisers, land-based F-3 ASW patrol aircraft and
the carrier-based A-6 aircraft with Harpoon missiles.
According to Admiral Holloway jjfj , this action will give
the U. S. Navy adequate anti-surface ship capability without
building more FHMs.
In the area of anti-surface ship capability, cost
effectiveness studies comparing the PHM with the F-3 and
FFG-7 showed the P-3 to be slightly more cost effective
than the PHM and the FFG-7 was slightly less. Even though
the indices of cost effectiveness were very close to one
another it must be remembered that the p-3 has, in addi-
tion, ASW capability and the FFG-7 is AAW and ASW capable.
Therefore, the Navy concluded that given limited funds,
procurement of multi-mission systems were preferred over
the PHM fjj .
The preceding mission and cost data was presented
and discussed during the recision hearings in July 1977
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£7J • . LOD and the Navy favored the recision.' of the FY 75
and FY 76 funds appropriated for production of five more
FHMs in spite of favorable comments by Navy spokesmen re-
garding the fact that the hardware had met all of its
operational expectations. Furthermore, when questioned
about the possibility of adding an additional capability
such as ASW, Navy spokesmen testified that such a change
would not be feasible with the present fixed design.
The Navy was not as concerned with the funds al-
ready appropriated as It was with the future outlays ex-
pected by operation of the PHM squadron which would run
from $20M to .$50M per year. Looking ahead to the I98O-8I
timeframe which the President set for balancing the budget,
the funds used to operate PHM would displace something else
that the Navy would rather have.
B. POLITICAL INFLUENCES
The strongest opponent of the President's recision
proposal was the Representative from Seattle (and Boeing's)
Congressional district. In his opening remarks at the hear-
ing £7/ > he reminded the Subcommittee of the growing im-
balance of naval power between the United States and Soviet
Russia and the need to protect our high value carrier task
groups. He felt that PHMs were a viable means of freeing
up these task groups in the Mediterranean and northern NATO
flanks because their cost is about one-third the cost of the
next least expensive combatant, the FFG-7, and their small
3^

size, speed and maneuverability make them less vulnerable
to torpedo and cruise missile attack. With the Navy grow-
ing progressively smaller, he questioned the Navy's judgment
in terminating a program of highly capable ships that has
already been paid for. He also reminded the Subcommittee
that as late as March 1977 > the Secretary of the Navy, the
Chief of Naval Operations and the surface mission sponsor
(OP-03) had strongly advocated continuance of the program.
After hearing all testimony, the Subcommittee voted
against the recision and the proposal did not go before
the Kouse. They (the Subcommittee) felt that the PHM
squadron was a seapower concept which differed sufficiently
from the Navy's traditional strategy of fewer, large multi-
mission ships to warrant evaluation. As a result of this
action, the Navy and DOD were forced to accept a program
which they had testified against.
Interestingly, the roles of the Congress and the Navy
in presenting pro and con arguments at the recision hear-
ings were completely reversed from the funding hearings in
197^. This reversal is probably due to a changing environ-
ment which manifests itself in the goals of decision makers.
A new President with new fiscal policies could have caused
the Navy to anticipate budget reductions and therefore,
reevaluate its priorities. A greater awareness of the
growing imbalance of naval capability between the U. 3. and
the U. S. S. H. could be a factor which partially reversed
the Congressional position on PHM. In any event, the
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point here is that a changing political environment ap-
pears to have greatly affected the outcome of the program.
C. CURRENT PHM MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
Having analyzed the rationale behind the program's re-
duction in scope, the unwillingness of the Navy to accept
the program and the Congressional reasons for its continua-
tion, the logical next step is to analyze the effects of
these events on the current management of the program.
Eriefly, the current status of the program is as folr-
lows : What was once a 60 ship NATO program now consists of
only six ships. The number of U. 3. operational personnel
involved, including ship's crews, squadron and MLSG person-
nel, has been correspondingly reduced from 1000 to 200.
The NATO interoperability requirement that was responsible
for the metric design and unique foreign equipments no
longer exists. The MLSG platform has been changed from an
afloat tender to a complex of mobile van containers and has
resulted in the degradation of the PKK's operational
flexibility in possible mission scenarios / 7j
•
The most significant problem the current program mana-
ger faces today is implementation of the logistics plans
that were formulated when Navy support for the program was
much stronger. Albeit the scope of the program has de-
creased, the ship itself has not changed, and the same
logistic support requirements still exist.
It was decided at the time the design trade-offs were
being made concerning manning and training that it was more
3t

feasible to rely or. priority detailing and training than it
would be to change the ship design to carry more crew mem-
bers. It was also recognized that implementation of these
plans would require special consideration by the Bureau of
Naval Personnel (BUPSRS) and the Chief of Naval Education
and Training (CNET). Continued cooperation of these com-
mands was justifiably assumed given the NATO involvement,
Navy-wide enthusiasm and the large number of personnel in-
volved when this assumption was made. Now that only six
ships remain, and the NATO political aspect has dis-
appeared, the enthusiasm to provide a specialized logistic
environment for the PHM has disappeared as well.
Table Bl indicates the prerequisite training courses
originally requested and those actually received. The
reduction of training at established Navy schools was
largely aimed at courses designed to enhance the mainten-
ance capability of equipment operators. EUFERS justified
deletion of these training courses based on their literal
interpretation of the PEM maintenance concept. Theo-
retically, this is a valid argument because decreased main-
tenance training is the benefit of a maintenance practice
which utilizes replacement modules and standard hand tools
for equipment repair. Detailed technical expertise at the
equipment part level is not required when such modules are
available.
Implementation of the maintenance and training con-
cepts has not been a problem with regard to the equipment
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designed especially for the PHM. Government furnished
equipment (GFE) on the PEN, however, does present a problem
because these equipments were designed for use aboard ships
with traditional maintenance practices. Replacement modules
are not currently available and detailed technical exper-
tise is required to repair these equipments at the part
level.
The Fleet Support Improvement Program (FKS 306) has
been responsible for developing replacement modules for GFE
aboard PHM but, according to the PHM program office, has
not shown significant progress to date because its efforts
have been dedicated to the GFE associated with larger pro-
grams such as the FFG-7. To compensate for this lack of
progress, the PHM program manager requested additional
maintenance training in the Navy Training Flan for PHM.
Had the PHM maintained its position as a major program,
then perhaps FMS 306 would have shown earlier results with
GFE modularization or EUFERS would have granted the addi-
tional training.
Table 3 2 lists the associated training equipments and
indicates almost all are not supported by the CF-39 sponsor.
The argument to justify this position is that such a pur-
chase of training aids would not be cost effective due to
the small number of personnel who would benefit from their
use
fjjj .
These examples indicate a reluctance on the part of the
I.'avy to commit resources and attention to other than the
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most major and visible programs. While this strategy is
probably best in view of scarce resources, it .is bound to
take its toll on FEM effectiveness. This causes a problem
for the program manager because he is responsible for dem-
onstrating the full potential of a PHM squadron consistent
with Congressional desires, but he is not receiving the
total support or resources to accomplish this objective.
IV . LESSONS LSARNSD
There are many unique aspects of the FHM program which
distinguish it from traditional ship acquisition urograms.
The hardware itself and its capabilities, the manning and
maintenance policies and the NATO involvement all required
innovative management approaches to integrate them into a
single system. The problems experienced by the program,
however, can be categorised into areas which can affect any
acquisition project no matter how unique it is, how effec-
tively it is managed or how well the system performs. This
chapter focuses on some of the specific circumstances which
seriously affected the outcome cf the program and catego-
rizes them into general system acquisition problems which
have the potential to affect any program, regardless of
the program manager's efforts.
A. CC5T
The PHK was first estimated to cost $20M per copy (197^
dollars) for 28 ships. The target price in the fixed
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price incentive production contract for five ships is 363M
each (1978 dollars). Discounting for inflation and reduc-
tion in size of the production run, there was actual cost
growth of approximately 1.4 times the original estimate.
Admiral Holloway 1 7J indicated that such cost growth is
usual in shipbuilding programs.
Fox llOj confirms that cost overruns are a fact of life
and generally occur either because original estimates were
too low, or because the program was not adequately control-
led to prevent inefficiencies. For obvious reasons,
however, a program manager who finds himself in an overrun
situation will most likely maintain that the original esti-
mate was too low.
Fox also points out that simply increasing the original
estimate would not solve the problem since contractors' in-
ternal budgets are determined by the amount of funds avail-
able. Higher estimates would only mean higher planned
costs. Competition causes contractors to use only the most
optimistic cost estimates. Likewise, the program manager
must use the most optimistic estimate in order to remain
competitive with other programs for funding.
Therefore, in programs where costing data is not known
with certainty, program managers and contractors alike stand
to gain more from being cost optimistic than they stand to
lose if cost overruns occur. The rewards and punishments





The time that will have elapsed between the concep-
tion of the FHM and the final production is approximately
12 years. This lengthy time period is also not -unusual
for shipbuilding programs. Time itself is not necessar-
ily a problem, but the longer the process takes, the
longer the program is exposed to the probability of changes
ir. technology and decision makers and their attitudes.
The PSM and the Harpoon missile were developed during
the same approximate time period. The Harpoon was con-
sidered by the FHM project office to be a system that would
enhance the effectiveness of the FHM rather than be a
threat to its existence. From a national defense stand-
point, advancing technology can certainly not be consider-
ed a problem, but to those loyal to the FHM, the advent of
the Harpoon missile combined with cost escalation made the
FHM appear less attractive when compared to alternate
methods of anti-surface ship warfare. Had. cost overruns
not occurred, or had. technology not produced the Harpoon
missile, the FHM would have maintained its position as a
major NATO program. The point here is that a program mana-
ger cannot readily assess the impact of advancing tech-
nology in another program on his own program, nor would it
make a difference if he could. His activities are con-
fined to his own area of responsibility.
kl

Decision makers change over time either by1 election,
promotion, retirement, et cetera. New decision makers
bring new attitudes and beliefs regarding the "best nation-
al interests". Former CNO Admiral Zumwalt was a strong
proponent of the FHM program during his tour as CNO /llj
.
Ee recognized the FHM as a new level of naval weapons
capability which should be actively pursued. His opinion
was based on recognition of reduced manpower and fiscal
resources within the Navy to combat the increasing Soviet
threat. The FHM offered a more versatile and less expen-
sive weapons system than the Navy has ever known before.
Zumwalt therefore believed that it made good sense to build
a portion of our naval capability around FHMs to relieve
the vulnerability of our high value targets and increase
the total number of ships. He also supported the concept
of an afloat MLSG to provide maximum mobility for the FHM
squadron.
Admiral Holloway, who relieved Admiral Zumwalt as CNO,
agreed that the FHM was a good naval asset to have, how-
ever, he felt that the Navy's limited resources could be
tetter spent on other programs. He testified accordingly
in a House subcommittee hearing when the President attempted
to rescind the funds obligated for construction of FHMs
L.7] . Admiral Holloway's views were consistent with those
of the newly appointed Secretary of Defense Brown and
Secretary of the Navy Claytor who were establishing
hz

defense priorities in accordance with newly elected Presi-
dent Carter's campaign promise to balance the federal
budget. No attempt will be made here to justify or argue
the decision to delete the PKM from the budget. The point
of this observation is that different personalities and
objectives of major policy makers greatly influenced the
eventual outcome of the program, in spite of the program
manager's efforts to make his program a success,
C. CONTROL
One major problem of the acquisition process that af-
fected the FHM is the apparent lack of a central source of
control over commitment, continuity or responsibility for
the effective management of the program. Theoretically,
all program decisions should be consistent with the "best
national interests". Realistically, however, this is an
unachievable endeavor since the term takes on different
meanings depending on the political point of view of the
decision maker and the time period involved. Given a
dynamic environment where the concept of the "best nation-
al interests" changes continuously, there is not nor can
there be any central control or responsibility to assure
continuity of the decision process.
There are numerous examples of discontinuous control
throughout the FHM program. The NATO FEM Irogram Manager
had no control over the participating countries. There
••fas no commitment of funds and no way to enforce continued
U 3

participation to keep the program on a large scale to
minimize the unit cost. On a national level, a similar
event occurred, by a change in Presidents and Secretaries
of Defense. A President is not obligated, to continue the
policies and programs of his predecessor.
With this tyce of discontinuity evident at the highest
levels, it is not difficult to understand how a commitment
might be agreed upon by the members of an early D3ARG (De-
fense Systems Acquisition Review Council) to rely heavily
on training at Navy Schools later in the FHM's life cycle.
Not only can the DSAHC members' objectives change with
the President's, but also the members of the committees
are likely to change before it becomes time to implement
the earlier decision. The PHM program manager position
itself turned over three times prior to the commencement of
construction on the five production ships.
Another example of discontinuous control and differing
prospectives on the "best interests of national defense"
is the power struggle between the Legislative and Executive
Branches of Government as it applies to the eventual out-
come of the PHM program. The reason the ships are being
built is because of Congressional clesire to examine a FEM
squadron's potential as an alternate sea power strategy.
The Executive Branch was desirous of deleting the program.
In order to objectively evaluate the FHM's potential re-
quires the outlay of a few more dollars to provide the
proper training support environment. To not provide the
UU

training support as planned makes it impossible for the
ship to perform as it was designed. This approach may have
saved some dollars in training, hut the true benefit of
the sunk cost of ship construction will never he known. A
cooperative effort by the Executive and Legislative
Eranches would have either caused continuation of the pro-
gram with full support or deletion of the program altogether
(thereby saving hundreds of millions of dollars).
Fox Q.(5] discusses additional factors in the systems
acquisition process which have the potential to affect the
outcome of a program and are beyond the span of control of
the program manager.
v. sukmahy
The PHK is a defense application of the latest hydro-
foil technology. It is a unique ship class not only be-
cause of its appearance and operational capabilities, but
also because of the non- traditional considerations that
entered the design trade-off process. The reduced manning
and maintenance concepts and the original HATO inter-
operability concept all presented non- traditional chal-
lenges to the management of the program.
In one respect, the program can be considered a com-
plete success. The early detailed planning that produced
the final design paid off because the ship, as evidenced
by the testing of the prototype, is capable of performing
k5

the mission tasks which precipitated its development.
This success can be rightfully attributed to the program
manager because the operational capability of the ship is
the result of efforts under his direct control.
In another respect, however, the program was not com-
pletely successful because it did not maintain its position
as a major program. The factors that caused the reduction
in the program's scope such as cost escalation, advancing
technology (the Harpoon missile) and varied interpreta-
tions of the "best national interests" by decision makers
external to the program office, were factors over which the
program manager could not exercise control.
These factors point to the unavoidable characteristic
of the systems acquisition process which is the lack of a
central controlling entity to provide for a consistent and
stabilized basis on which to make program decisions. This
characteristic gives the systems acquisition process
strength in that it forces programs to adjust to a changing
environment. However, the same characteristic has a weak-






The discussion which follows is the procedure used for
the preparation of the PSMD for the PHM-1 class ship [12/ .
It serves as the justification for the manning level cur-
rently used aboard PHM. To summarize, the document is
prepared in the following steps:
1. Projected Operational Environment (FOE) is reviewed
2. Operational billets are identified.
3. Total weekly manhours required to operate and
maintain the ship are computed.
k. Manhours are allocated to billets subject to
constraints
.
A. FROJECTED OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (PCE)
The projected operational environment establishes the
most demanding operational condition for which a ship must
be manned. The FOE for the PHM class is "at sea in war-
time". This presupposes enough personnel to perform all
offensive and defensive functions while in Readiness Con-
dition I (all hands - General Quarters) and maintain Readi-
ness condition III (port and starboard - two section watch)
at sea for periods of five days followed by two d.ays of up-
keep during which time the ship's crew will be on liberty
and the ML3G personnel will perform necessary maintenance.
47

E. WATCHSTANDING AND OPERATIONAL WORKLOAD REQUIREMENTS
Predictions for the number of personnel required to
operate the ship in its projected operational environment
(Readiness Conditions I and III) were based on the ex-
perience gained by the operation of previous hydrofoil
craft and the known weapons configuration of the PHM.
As indicated by Table Al, 1? persons are required for
Condition I and 15 for Condition III (an officer assumes
one of the watchstations in the starboard section). These
figures became the basis for the establishment of 17 bil-
lets (15 watchstanders and 2 non-watchstanders) . Rates
and ratings for each billet were determined by a combina-
tion of experience and application of the operational
functions and task statements contained in the Navy Enlist-
ed Occupational Standards JI3J • The operational billets
and their personnel requirements are summarized in Table A2.
Although the ship must have the capability of achiev-
ing Condition I readiness, the operational hours are based
on Readiness Condition III. The hours allocated to opera-
tional manning is 60 hours per week per watchstander
(5 days /week x 12 hours /day /watchstander).
C. PREVENTIVE AND CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE (PM & CM) WORKLOAD
Organizational level preventive maintenance assigned to
the PHM crew is limited to daily preventive maintenance
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All other FM is accomplished by the MLSG during the two-
day upkeep period. A planned maintenance system automated
list tailored to the prototype, USS PEGASUS (PHM-1), was
used to obtain a listing of shipboard equipments. Most
equipments have established Navy standards which itemize
the maintenance task, man-hours to accomplish, skill level
and frequency of the maintenance action. By use of these
figures, the weekly man-hour requirement for preventive
maintenance was determined by totaling the daily task man-
hour requirements and multiplying by five days per week.
The daily preventive maintenance for the remaining two
days is accomplished by the MLSG. The total preventive
maintenance man-hours assigned to the ship's crew is 23.5
plus an additional standard of 2,0% of the preventive main-
tenance man-hour requirements for each billet for "make
ready - put away" time.
Corrective maintenance is estimated as a function of
preventive maintenance hours. In order to estimate correc-
tive maintenance it is necessary to separate the preventive
maintenance into categories as follows: 1.5 weekly hours
for electronics technician (ST) type work and 22 hours for
all other preventive maintenance work. As specified by
OFNAV instructions U.4J , the standard ratio of PH to CM
for estimation is one hour of PM to one hour of CM for
ST-type work and two hours of PM to one hour of CM for all









PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE 1.5 22.0 23.5
CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE 1.5 11.0 12.5
PRODUCTIVE ALLOWANCE
(30% OF PM) .45 6.6 7.05
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D. FACILITY MAINTENANCE (FM)
Facility maintenance for the PHM consists of little
more than daily housekeeping chores. Major FM such as
painting and chipping is performed by the MLSG. The week-
ly hours for FM were determined as follows:
1. FM tasks were identified by interviewing
members of the prototype.
2. The time to perform each task was standard-
ized in accordance with a prescribed Navy
Standard Work Rate Assumption (from GFNAV
instructions Jiy for each task as a function
of space size or number of units (i.e., sinks,
ladders, etc. )
.
3. The weekly FM man-hours per space was computed
by multiplying the task action time by the
frequency of that action per week.
'4-. The grand total of 30.59 hours is the sum of
the weekly FM times for each space. Table kk
summarizes FM man-hours by space.
E. UTILITY TASK AND EVOLUTION (UT)
This category accounts for the man-hours spent perform-
ing special details while underway. Of all the special
details (such as man overboard, low-visibility operations,
towing, etc.) only two, the Special Sea and Anchor Detail
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tine consumption or frequency to require accounting of
time for the purpose of computing required man-hours.
These details take place concurrently with operational
watchstanding. Therefore, the man-hours allocated to this
category apply only to those personnel who are not on
Condition III watch during the special detail, Watch-
stander time has already been accounted for in a separate
category.
The following subparagraphs account for the UT time
category
:
1. Special Sea and Anchor Detail is an all-hands
evolution. Table A5 shows the time spent by
the additional nine crewmembers who are not
on watch while completing one getting away
and one docking.
2. Replenishment at Sea is also an all-hands
evolution. The hours allocate'! to the Re-
plenishment at Sea Detail depends upon the
frequency of refueling during a weekly mission.
Since this figure is likely to vary, a weekly
average of two underway fuelings is assumed
based on a 120-hour mission with approximate-
ly 11.2 hours foilborne. The time spent on
each refueling is a function of a standard
pumping rate of 16,000 gallons per hour with
a 2i-inch hose connection. Replenishment at
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The total UT man-hour workload for FHM is 28.044 hours
per week. The non-watchstanders (the radioman and the mess
management specialist) are allocated UT for each detail.
The watchstanders are each assumed to be off watch for
half the UT details and on watch (operational manning
hours) for the other half. Therefore, watchstanders are
allocated UT man-hours for only half of the UT details.
Equitably distributing this workload, each watchstander is
allocated 1.476 UT weekly hours and each non-watchstander
is allocated 2.952 UT weekly man-hours.
F. ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT MANNING (A/ 3)
The PHM lacks space and facilities for complete admin-
istrative services such as postal office, personnel office,
disbursing, medical, etc. Most of these functions are per-
formed by the MLSG. Very little administrative and support
man-hours are spent by other than the mess management
specialist and the radioman. A/S hours for the mess
management specialist, radioman and watchstanders were
estimated by interviewing the crew of the prototype and
are summarized in Tables A7 through A9.
G. SERVICE DIVERSION AND TRAINING ALLOWANCE (3D)
Service Diversion and Training consists of quarters,
award ceremonies, departmental training, et cetera. Man-
hours for this category is much less than is common on




ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS :




1. Plan daily work
2. Make Coffee/Clean Coffee Pot
3. Set up mess tables
4. Cook breakfast.
5. Prepare Menu
6. Prepare stores inventory
7. Prepare daily subsistance reports
8. Prepare noon meal
9. Prepare evening meal
10. Clean Galley
11. Store leftover food
12. Review menu, break out supplies
13. Break out any provisions
14. Wash dishes
15. Stow dishes

























1. Plan work 1.00
2. Process special request chits .20
3. Monitor performance of personnel opera-
ting communications equipment 15.00
4. Monitor performance of equipment 15.00
5. Manage communication traffic 2.50
6. Monitor circuitry engaged in transmission 2.50
7. Prepare stub requisitions .20
8. Maintain publications and documents 1.25
9. Record and file electronic communications 2.50
10. Inspect equipment 2.50
11. Manage and control communications
classified documents 1.25
ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT WEEKLY HOURS




ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS :
ADMINISTRATIVE (PHM AT-SEA) SUPPORT
WEEKLY HOURS PER DEPARTMENT
TASK OPERATIONS WEAPONS ENGINEERING
1. Perform departmental training .20 .20 .20
2. Process stub requisition chits .20 .20 .20
3. Maintain publications .20 .20 .20
4. Maintain charts .30 - -
5. Process special request chits .10 .10 .10
6. Maintain files .10 .10 .10
7. Plan & assign work to
subordinates 2.50 1.00 .50
8. Check work of subordinates .30 .30 .30
9. Conduct enlisted performance
evaluations .20 .20 .20
10. Prepare/update watch quarter
and station bill .10 .10 .10
11. Administer personnel quali-
fication standards .10 .10 ,10
12. Instruct subordinates in all
applications of safety
precautions .20 .20 .20
13. Maintain department files,
training data, space and
equipment logs .20 .20 .20
14. Attend briefing's .10 .10 .10
15. Review & route instructions
and notices .10 .10 .10
16. Control & supervises handling
and submission of all forms
and reports originating
within the department- .20 .20 .20
17. Draft/edit correspondence .10 .10 .10
18. Counseling personnel .10 .10 .10




servation & cleanliness of all
assigned spaces
.40 .40 .40
21. Review maintenance records .10 .10 .10
22. Rrview weapons orders and
directives -
.10
23. Perform department PO duties
.10 .10 .10
24. Prepare fuel & daily water report - -
.10
25. Prepare chemicals for water test - - ,10
26. Test fuel - -
,10
27. Make log entries ,20 .20 .20
TOTALS 8.60 4.40 4.10
(GRAND TOTAL - 17.10)
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OFNAV letter, this allowance has been set at two hours per
week for each crew member.
H. STANDARD NAVY WORKWEEK AFLOAT CONSTRAINT
The standard workweek afloat flj] prescribes the
maximum weekly hours for enlisted watchstanders at sea as
7^ hours and 66 hours for non-watchstanders. The work-
week may be less than those amounts but should not exceed
them unless compelled by emergency or battle conditions.
For the PHM crew, the standard workweek is completed
during its five-day mission. There is no in-port watch-
standing or workload requirement except during scheduled
maintenance and overhaul periods. Table A10 gives the
breakdown of both the Standard Navy Workweek and the PHM
version of the Navy Standard which represents the upper
bound on weekly man-hours assuming Condition III.
I. WORKLOAD SUMMARY
Table All summarizes the man-hours by category dis-
cussed previously. Note that a standard 20$ productive
allowance to account for inefficiencies usually experi-
enced by shipboard workers has been included. Also note
that the two hours per man for Service Diversion and
Training has not yet been included because the total
number of personnel or the need for additional billets
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Table A12 indicates that 15 watchstanders and two non-
watchstanders provide enough man-hours to accomplish all
tasks even after including the 3D allowance.
The final step in the manning document preparation
process is the allocation of the man-hours in each cate-
gory. Priority is given to watchstanding hours and main-
tenance hours requiring higher skill levels. Other tasks
are allocated equitably being mindful not to exceed the
PHI'l version of the Navy standard of 70 hours for watch-
standers and 66 hours for non-watchstanders. Allocation
of all weekly hours is shown in Table A13.
J. OFFICER MANNING
Kan-hour breakdown for officers is not a part of this
analysis, but an officer billet summary is shown in Table
Alk. Officer manning for PHM was the result of the combi-
nation of a functional analysis of the operational re-
quirements for fighting the ship and responsibilities and
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Appendix A discusses the rationale for the number
of personnel to man the PHM as well as for ratings and
skill levels required. Once the ship's manning has been
established it is necessary to determine how these per-
sonnel will be trained to operate and maintain the ship.
A. TRAINING CONCEPT
The uniqueness of the PHM which distinguishes it
from traditional combat vessels requires a corresponding-
ly unique training concept. As the product of a NATO
design the ship contains equipments not found on other
Navy vessels. The reduced manning concept which was a
result of the operational and maintenance concepts re-
quires highly skilled personnel who are capable of opera-
tion as well as repair of the equipment. As forecasted
early in the conceptual phase, more training is antici-
pated to be required for PHI'S crew members than for crew
members on other Navy ships. The following information
taken from the Navy Training Plan for the PEM QQ dis-
cusses the training goals and methods planned for
accomplishing those goals.
"Existing Navy training courses will be used to the
maximum extent possible to train 1-KV. personnel. Training
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requirements that cannot be satisfied by existing Navy
schools will be met by contractor training for the initial
crex^s and by formal training and on-board training under
the cognizance of the Squadron Commander." The manning
document for the MLSG includes instructor billets to pro-
vide for this additional training.
Training for the crew falls into two broad cate-
gories :
1. Prerequisite Training
i i ii a ii i M
Prerequisite training consists of both pro-
fessional and technical courses normally completed in
preparation for assignment to a billet. Examples are:
a ?X0 (Prospective Executive Officer) course for officers,
and an NEC awarding course for enlisted personnel or
course required for performance in an identified FHM
billet for which an NSC is not required.
In general, these training requirements are gene-
rated by the equipment maintenance or operational re-
quirement or by watch station assignments. These
prerequisite training requirements will be met by existing
Navy Schools and will be received prior to undertaking PEK
unique training.
2. "IHH Unique" Training
Unique training consists of the courses specifi-
cally designed to prepare personnel to perform operation
and maintenance functions unique to FEM equipment. There
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are no established Navy schools for this type of training
due to previous lack of requirement for them, nor are Navy
schools expected to be established for PHM equipment be-
cause of the relatively small number of personnel involved.
The training must nonetheless be accomplished. Two ap-
proaches to accomplish this training will be utilized:
factory training and on-board training under the cogni-
zance of the PHM Squadron Commander.
Factory training by the Boeing Company provides
the original body of knowledge and skills to selected
initial crewmembers and ML5G instructor personnel on a one-
time basis. Replacement personnel are trained either
on-board by personnel being relieved or formally by the
instructors at the MLSG training division. The success
of this training approach depends upon the Navy's detail-
ing ability to provide contact reliefs, especially for the
instructors, to preserve the body of knowledge first ac-
quired from contractor training. In the case of gapped
billets, the knowledge could only be restored by additional
(and costly) contracted training arrangements with Boeing.
3. TRAINING COURSE REQUIREMENTS
Training requirements were established by an analysis
of the operational and maintenance tasks required by each
billet. Personal interviews with prototype crewmembers were
extensively used. The content of Navy courses already in
existence was also reviewed. Whenever a training
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requirement could be satisfied by one of these schools,
that school became prerequisite training for the billet.
All other training requirements not satisfied in this man-
ner v/ere incorporated into a formal training course to be
conducted locally at the ML3G or at the Boeing plant for
the initial crews.
Table El lists by billet the prerequisite and FHM
unique training courses deemed necessary by the project
manager for the effective utilization of the ship. The
list comes from the 1976 version of the FHM Navy Training
Flan [V] which was approved by the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations. Approval of the training plan does not
guarantee eventual funding for each course identified;
it merely validates the need. Actual funding approval
depends largely upon the priority placed on each require-
ment by the Chief of Naval Education and Training during
the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submission process.
The items marked with an asterisk (*) were eventually not
funded, and the crew will not receive these prerequisite
courses. The reasons for courses not being funded are dis-
cussed in the "Analysis" chapter,
C. TRAINING EQUIPMENT AND DEVICES
Training equipments are actual hardware equipments
such as an actual radar or engine which is used for train-
ing. Training devices are simulators or mockups of the
actual equipment used in place of the actual equipment for
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Training equipments and devices are extremely impor-
tant to the success of the PHM training program due to the
low manning concept. Each crew member has to know how to
perform his job before the ship gets underway. There is
not enough space aboard to carry personnel in a training
status for more than one day. It is necessary that the
crew receive hands-on operational and maintenance train-
ing through maximum use of training equipments and devices
to minimize the need for on-board training.
The Project Office requested the training equipments
and devices listed in Table 52 by letter in 1978 before
including them in the Navy Training Flan. The notation
"not supported by CNC" indicates that the equipments were
not supported by the OP- 39 surface warfare sponsor of the
program and therefore are not likely candidates for PQM-81
funding. Support and funding rationale for these items








AIRESEARCH Gas Turbine Maintenance
Trainer
HECI
Harpoon Engagement Course Indicator
Automatic Control System
(LITER) Inertial Gyrocompass
SPS-63 Surface Search Radar
LOCATION FUNDING STATUS
Great Lakes Not Supported By CNO
San Diego Not Supported By CNO
MLSG Not Supported By CNO
MLSG Funded POM 80








MTU Diesel Head with Valve Train
Cutaway Mockup
Bow Thruster Motor, Cutaway Mockup
Bridge Console Mockup, Navigation
Distilling Plant, Cutaway Mockup
Vickers Hydraulic Trainer
Logic Trainer
Electronics , Fire Control
LOCATION FUNDING STATUS
Great Lakes Not Supported By CNO
MLSG Not Supported By CNO
MLSG Not Supported By CNO
MLSG Not Supported By CNO
MLSG Being Considered
For Funding
MLSG Not Supported By CNO
MLSG Not Supported By CNO
MLSG Not Supported 3y CNO
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